The renewed invocation of the Jammu and Kashmir Autonomy Resolution of 2000 raises a question far larger than the immediate political debate over restoration of statehood. It brings back into public discourse an older constitutional idea—the restoration of a distinctive constitutional relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and the Union of India associated broadly with the pre-1953 position.
That debate cannot, however, be conducted in 2026 as though the constitutional developments of August 2019 and the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered on 11 December 2023 never occurred.
The historical criticism of the autonomy project has been that, even when presented as autonomy within India rather than separation from India, its architecture emphasised constitutional separateness. Its critics therefore saw autonomy as providing political and institutional space in which a consciousness of separateness could survive and potentially strengthen separatist narratives.
Supporters of autonomy strongly dispute that interpretation. The National Conference has historically maintained that autonomy was sought within the Indian Union. That distinction must be acknowledged. Advocacy of autonomy is not, merely by itself, legally synonymous with advocacy of secession.
The real question today is consequently more precise: Can the political concept underlying the Autonomy Resolution of 2000 simply be revived after Parliament fundamentally changed J&K’s constitutional position in 2019 and the Supreme Court subsequently upheld the central constitutional outcome of those changes?
Autonomy Was Never Merely Administrative Decentralisation
There is a fundamental difference between decentralisation and the historical autonomy demand in Jammu and Kashmir.
Every State within the Indian constitutional system possesses legislative and executive powers distributed under the Constitution. States frequently demand greater fiscal authority, increased administrative discretion and greater participation in decisions taken by the Union. Such demands form an ordinary part of Indian federal politics.
The National Conference’s historical autonomy project went considerably further.
The 2000 resolution sought restoration of a constitutional arrangement broadly associated with the position existing before 9 August 1953. The political significance of the demand therefore lay in seeking restoration of a degree of constitutional distinctiveness that had progressively diminished as provisions of the Constitution of India were extended to Jammu and Kashmir.
This is precisely why autonomy became inseparable from the wider political debate concerning J&K’s relationship with the Union.
The controversy was never merely about whether Srinagar or New Delhi should exercise a particular administrative power. It concerned the nature of the constitutional relationship itself.
For critics of the autonomy project, that distinction was crucial. They argued that continuously presenting Jammu and Kashmir’s relationship with India as constitutionally exceptional could reinforce a psychology of separateness.
For supporters of autonomy, precisely the opposite was true: recognition of J&K’s distinct history and identity, they argued, could accommodate regional aspirations within India.
These competing narratives shaped J&K politics for decades.
From Accession to Constitutional Integration
Jammu and Kashmir unquestionably possessed an unusual constitutional history.
Article 370 provided the constitutional mechanism through which provisions of the Constitution of India were progressively applied to the erstwhile State.
Over several decades, numerous provisions of the Indian Constitution were extended to Jammu and Kashmir through Presidential Orders.
Two fundamentally different interpretations emerged from this process.
Those favouring greater integration regarded these developments as the gradual constitutional integration of Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India.
Autonomy advocates frequently described the same process as an erosion of the constitutional arrangement originally envisaged for the State.
The 2000 Autonomy Resolution must be understood against this background.
Its objective was not simply greater administrative efficiency or financial decentralisation. It sought substantial restoration of an earlier constitutional position.
This raised the fundamental question that dominated J&K’s constitutional politics:
Should Jammu and Kashmir maintain a uniquely distinctive constitutional relationship with India, or should it function substantially within the same constitutional framework applicable throughout the Union?
It was within this contest that the autonomy-versus-integration debate developed.
The Connection With Separatist Politics
The word “separatism” needs to be used carefully.
Separatism in its strict legal and political sense involves seeking separation from the sovereign State. The National Conference’s declared position has historically been that its autonomy programme contemplated Jammu and Kashmir remaining within India.
Autonomy therefore cannot automatically be equated with secession.
The historical criticism is nevertheless important.
Critics of the autonomy model argue that separateness can exist without formal separation.
A separate constitutional arrangement, exceptional political institutions, restrictions upon the ordinary application of Union laws and a continuing discourse portraying J&K’s relationship with India as fundamentally different from that of other States could, in this view, provide an intellectual and political environment in which ideas of distinct political identity could flourish.
It is in this sense that critics describe autonomy as an “engine of separatism.”
The argument is not necessarily that everybody demanding autonomy seeks independence. Such a proposition would be both historically and legally overbroad.
The argument is instead that constitutional exceptionalism can reinforce a political consciousness of exceptionalism, which separatist movements may then seek to exploit.
Whether autonomy reduces alienation through accommodation or reinforces separateness through exceptionalism has long been one of the central disagreements in J&K politics.
August 2019 Fundamentally Changed the Debate
Whatever arguments could legitimately be advanced before August 2019, the constitutional landscape thereafter changed fundamentally.
On 5 August 2019, the Union Government initiated constitutional measures that ultimately resulted in Article 370 ceasing to operate in its previous form.
The constitutional arrangement through which Article 35A had operated also came to an end.
Parliament simultaneously enacted the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, reorganising the former State into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
The importance of these developments cannot be understated.
The earlier autonomy debate operated inside the constitutional architecture created by Article 370.
The 2000 Autonomy Resolution could therefore proceed from the existence of that constitutional architecture and argue about how the relationship between J&K and the Union should operate within it.
After 2019, that premise fundamentally changed.
The constitutional mechanism upon which the historical autonomy programme depended no longer operates in its previous form.
Political language developed in 2000 therefore cannot simply be transplanted into the constitutional environment of 2026.
Parliament Cannot Be Ignored
Another aspect of the post-2019 position is equally significant.
The transformation was not simply the result of an executive announcement.
Parliament acted.
The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, was enacted by Parliament and fundamentally altered the institutional structure of the former State.
The present Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir functions within that statutory framework.
This becomes particularly significant when examining the authority of the present Legislative Assembly.
Section 13 of the Reorganisation Act makes Article 239A of the Constitution applicable to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 14 provides for a Legislative Assembly for the Union Territory.
The present Assembly is consequently not the legislature of the erstwhile State continuing under the old pre-2019 arrangement. Its immediate statutory structure arises from the parliamentary legislation forming part of the post-2019 constitutional reorganisation.
That produces an extraordinary feature of the present debate:
The legislature functioning under the post-2019 framework is being used as a political forum to preserve reference to an autonomy resolution whose objective was restoration of a constitutional arrangement preceding that very framework.
There is nothing inherently impermissible about legislators debating constitutional change. Democratic institutions exist precisely for political discussion.
But the distinction between the right to advocate change and the constitutional authority to accomplish that change becomes decisive.
The Supreme Court Judgment Cannot Be Wished Away
The next constitutional milestone came on 11 December 2023.
A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution.
The judgment fundamentally altered the terms upon which any contemporary autonomy argument must proceed.
The Supreme Court held that Article 370 was intended to be a temporary provision.
It upheld the central constitutional outcome through which Article 370 ceased to operate in its earlier form.
Even more significantly for the historical autonomy debate, the Court rejected the proposition that Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of internal sovereignty distinct from India after accession.
This conclusion strikes at an important constitutional premise underlying arguments which portray J&K’s relationship with India as a continuing relationship between two repositories of sovereignty.
Once the Supreme Court has held that Jammu and Kashmir possessed no residual internal sovereignty separate from India, any future arrangement concerning J&K must necessarily derive its authority from the Constitution of India.
Autonomy cannot therefore be asserted as an independent sovereign entitlement existing outside the Constitution.
Any constitutional restructuring must proceed through constitutionally competent institutions and constitutionally recognised procedures.
It should equally be acknowledged that the Supreme Court did not approve every technique used during the 2019 process. It held that Article 367 could not be employed indirectly to amend Article 370 in the particular manner attempted through part of C.O. 272.
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the substantive exercise of power under Article 370(3) and the ultimate constitutional result.
That distinction matters.
The constitutional outcome of 2019 survived scrutiny by India’s highest constitutional court.
What Can the Present Assembly Actually Achieve?
This brings us to the central institutional question.
The present J&K Legislative Assembly can debate.
It can pass resolutions.
It can articulate political aspirations.
It can demand restoration of statehood.
It can request the Union Government to take particular actions.
It can urge Parliament to reconsider existing legislation.
Its members and political parties can advocate future constitutional amendments.
But an Assembly resolution cannot, by itself, restore Article 370.
It cannot revive Article 35A.
It cannot override an Act of Parliament.
It cannot independently recreate the pre-1953 constitutional relationship.
And it cannot nullify a constitutional position which has already undergone adjudication before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.
The question facing anybody seeking revival of the 2000 autonomy arrangement is therefore straightforward:
Under what existing provision of the Constitution, and through which constitutionally competent institution, is the pre-1953 arrangement proposed to be restored?
Unless that question is answered, the autonomy resolution remains primarily a political declaration rather than an instrument possessing independent constitutional capacity to change J&K’s present status.
Statehood Is Not Autonomy
Another distinction is particularly important in the contemporary debate.
Restoration of statehood and restoration of the pre-2019 special constitutional position are not the same thing.
Jammu and Kashmir can theoretically regain statehood without restoration of Article 370 or Article 35A.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 2023 judgment recorded the Solicitor General’s statement that statehood would be restored to Jammu and Kashmir.
Statehood therefore remains a distinct constitutional and political question.
That makes the continuing invocation of the 2000 Autonomy Resolution particularly worthy of scrutiny.
If the immediate political objective is restoration of statehood, why must a resolution seeking statehood preserve reference to the old autonomy demand?
The National Conference’s position can be understood as maintaining continuity with its longstanding political programme.
Its opponents can legitimately argue that restoration of statehood should not be conflated with revival of a pre-2019 special-status agenda.
The two propositions have entirely different constitutional consequences.
The Constitutional Paradox
There is therefore a striking paradox. The present Assembly exists within the post-2019 constitutional and statutory arrangement.
The authority under which it functions is part of the very institutional framework created after the constitutional transformation that the historical autonomy programme sought, in important respects, to avoid or reverse.
Yet that Assembly is now a forum in which the political relevance of the 2000 autonomy formula is being preserved.
This may be politically permissible.
But political symbolism cannot substitute for constitutional authority.
A legislature cannot acquire power merely by passing a resolution asserting an objective outside its legislative competence.
Nor can an Assembly resolution supersede Parliament or undo a constitutional position upheld by the Supreme Court.
Why 2019 Must Be the New Constitutional Starting Point
The most important weakness in attempts to revive the old autonomy discourse is therefore not political but constitutional.
Jammu and Kashmir’s constitutional position changed in 2019.
Parliament legislated.
The President exercised constitutional powers.
Article 370 ceased to operate in its previous form.
The constitutional foundation upon which Article 35A operated disappeared.
The former State was reorganised.
The Constitution of India became applicable without the earlier Article 370 framework.
And in December 2023, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the central constitutional result while rejecting the proposition that J&K possessed separate internal sovereignty.
These developments cannot be erased by political resolution.
That does not mean autonomy cannot be discussed.
In a democracy, political parties can advocate constitutional amendments and changes in governmental structure. Even constitutional arrangements that do not presently exist may be proposed politically.
But that is fundamentally different from treating the 2000 resolution as though its constitutional premises continue unchanged.
Any contemporary autonomy proposal must now answer:
What is the constitutional mechanism for achieving it after 2019?
Without identifying that mechanism, the autonomy demand remains an expression of political ideology rather than an immediately operative constitutional programme.
Separateness Versus Integration
The historical debate over autonomy should therefore be understood with precision.
The National Conference has maintained that autonomy was intended to preserve J&K’s distinctive identity while remaining within India.
Critics have argued that the very institutionalisation of constitutional distinctiveness contributed to a politics of separateness and provided narratives that separatist organisations could exploit.
These competing interpretations form part of J&K’s political history.
But post-2019, another consideration has become paramount.
The constitutional framework itself has changed.
The old argument cannot simply resume from where it stood in 2000.
Twenty-six years have passed. Parliament has acted. The constitutional position has changed. The Supreme Court has pronounced upon Article 370. J&K’s institutional structure has been reorganised.
The constitutional discussion must therefore begin from present constitutional reality rather than historical aspiration.
The Constitutional Clock Cannot Simply Be Turned Back
Jammu and Kashmir has travelled through several distinct constitutional phases: accession, Article 370, progressive extension of provisions of the Constitution of India, demands for greater autonomy, the 2000 Autonomy Resolution, the constitutional transformation of August 2019 and the Supreme Court judgment of December 2023.
History can be debated.
Political decisions can be criticised.
Constitutional amendments can be advocated.
But the constitutional clock cannot simply be reset to 1953 through a resolution of the present Legislative Assembly.
The National Conference remains entitled within democratic politics to advocate constitutional change. Its opponents remain equally entitled to argue that the autonomy model perpetuated constitutional exceptionalism and encouraged a politics of separateness.
But neither proposition changes the present distribution of constitutional authority.
The fundamental question today is therefore no longer merely:
“How much autonomy should Jammu and Kashmir have?”
The logically prior question is:
“What constitutional authority exists today to recreate the pre-2019 arrangement, and through what lawful constitutional mechanism could that authority be exercised?”
That is the question created by August 2019 and reinforced by the Supreme Court judgment of December 2023.
The present Legislative Assembly can debate aspirations. It can demand restoration of statehood. It can make recommendations to the Union. Political parties can campaign for future constitutional changes.
But a legislature functioning within the post-2019 framework cannot, merely through its own resolution, recreate the constitutional order that preceded that framework.
The distinction between the democratic freedom to advocate constitutional change and the constitutional authority to effect constitutional change is fundamental.
Autonomy may therefore continue as a political idea. But any attempt to present the 2000 formula as a presently available constitutional arrangement must confront Parliament’s actions of 2019, the disappearance of the earlier Article 370 framework and the binding constitutional position declared by the Supreme Court.
That is why the debate in 2026 cannot simply return to 2000.
The constitutional ground beneath it has changed.
(The Author is the Chief Spokesperson of JK BJP)
