Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and other oil and gas exporting countries in the region could gradually resume normal exports while Iran remained economically isolated.
A limited conflict could change this landscape for Iran. Although Iran is paying a heavy military and economic price, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and, through the Houthis, pressure around Bab al-Mandab continue to affect global shipping, insurance costs and energy markets. Even limited uncertainty forces governments, shipowners and importers to pay attention to Iran’s demands.
In effect, Tehran may believe it still possesses leverage.
Iran also appears to be trying to reshape the diplomatic discussion. Rather than accepting unrestricted freedom of navigation, it has repeatedly signalled that shipping should operate under rules agreed with or administered by Iran. If that interpretation is correct, Tehran’s objective may be that any future reopening of the Strait of Hormuz reflects Iranian influence rather than a return to the pre-war status quo. An ongoing, limited conflict would allow Iran to keep the pressure on to achieve this goal.
From Tehran’s perspective, keeping the crisis alive below the threshold of total war may therefore be preferable to accepting a ceasefire that leaves sanctions, the blockade and economic isolation largely unchanged.
There may also be domestic calculations. Iran continues to face high very inflation rates, unemployment, economic hardship and public dissatisfaction. During periods of external conflict, governments often find it easier to suppress internal opposition, justify tighter security measures and rally support around national defence. That does not remove Iran’s economic problems, but it may reduce the immediate political pressure created by them.
