US trade representative Jamieson Greer’s June 23–24 visit to India is intended to advance the proposed bilateral trade agreement. Yet the broader picture suggests a shift in Washington’s priorities. The US increasingly views India as a large market rather than a central strategic partner in its Asian strategy.
The clearest signal came on June 16, when the Pentagon reverted to calling the US Indo-Pacific Command as the US Pacific Command, the name used before 2018. The purpose of 2018 renaming was explicit — to place India at the heart of America’s strategy in Asia and acknowledge the growing importance of the Indian Ocean in balancing China’s rise. Reversing that decision suggests that Washington no longer sees India as central to its regional security architecture.
Many analysts argue that US interest in India as a strategic partner has weakened because New Delhi did not fully embrace the role Washington envisioned for it, instead maintaining its strategic autonomy, buying Russian oil amid the Ukraine war, and choosing independent positions rather than aligning with the US on major geopolitical issues.
This misses a much bigger geopolitical reality. India’s changing place in US strategy has less to do with its choices and more to do with a profound shift in America’s assessment of China — and of its own ability to shape the international order.
Efforts to elevate India as a key US partner were built on the belief that China could be balanced through a coalition of regional powers. China+1, supply-chain resilience, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework reflected that goal. Today, that assumption appears increasingly difficult to sustain.
Despite years of efforts to isolate China, it remains the world’s largest manufacturing power, dominates critical supply chains, leads in several advanced technologies, and has steadily increased its global influence. China’s all-round heft in the world today is far greater than when the Indo-Pacific strategy was conceived.
Recent geopolitical developments have reinforced this reality. During the conflict in Ukraine, China provided Russia with a vital economic lifeline by purchasing energy and maintaining commercial ties. During the Iran crisis, China remained a major actor in West Asia, providing supplies to Iran. In both cases, China demonstrated that it possesses the economic scale and geopolitical reach to protect its interests despite US opposition.
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For Washington, these developments carry an uncomfortable lesson: China can’t be contained in the way the Soviet Union once was. Thus, US strategy is gradually shifting from containment toward a more pragmatic mix of competition, selective cooperation, and accommodation. Managing relations with China is becoming more important than building ever-larger coalitions against it.
Thus, India’s declining prominence is not evidence of its failure. Rather, it reflects a reassessment of US priorities. If the objective is no longer to build a broad coalition to contain China, then India’s value as a balancing instrument inevitably diminishes.
What replaces the strategic partnership? Washington increasingly sees India as a major market for US exports and the largest data provider for its tech+AI giants.
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As it seeks greater access through the proposed trade deal and other channels, India should negotiate from a position of equality and reject any arrangement that undermines its economic or strategic interests.
Ajay Srivastava is founder, Global Trade Research Initiative. The views expressed are personal
