CROSS ROADS
According to a new report from the UN Security Council body monitoring counter-terrorism sanctions, the Red Fort terror attack in New Delhi in November 2025 has been carried out by Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). The report also mentioned that AQIS continued to evolve from a fragmented group into a regional terrorist entity, and instead of forming large terrorist groups, the organisation adopted a strategy of expanding its network through small, separate cells. The UNSC specifically expressed concern about Bangladesh, saying that the AQIS may attempt to use the neighbouring country to establish new terrorist cells.
Earlier in 2023, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the 1267 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council (UNSC) highlighting the mysterious advent of international terrorist organizations, noted in its 32nd report that Al-Qaeda was “shaping” its regional affiliate in the Indian subcontinent to spread its operations into Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Bangladesh and Myanmar, and that terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, the Islamic State (IS) and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) were planning to expand their presence from Afghanistan and Pakistan into peripheral countries such as India.
It added that there are still some 200 active members of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the parent terrorist group’s South Asia-focused affiliate, who may be plotting attacks in J&K, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The report also highlighted the grooming of an affiliate by AQIS for Kashmir operations. Additionally, it raised the alarm that while expanding their network at home in India, AQIS supporters were also encouraging recruits to join Jihadi groups outside India. That India has seen fewer attacks than other countries in the region in the past years, is majorly due to its improved counterterrorism capabilities since the 2008 Mumbai attack, and minorly, a good amount of sheer fortune.
While Al Qaeda had first mentioned India as a target in 1996, when Osama bin Laden had made a reference to both J&K and Assam, for the following several years however the outfit did not succeed in achieving anything significant in these places. Barring stray and unconfirmed reports over the subsequent decades of inroads being made by Al Qaeda in J&K, not much tangible emerged to demonstrate that the outfit had broken the barrier to enter the Kashmiri psyche.
Then, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was founded in late 2014, when Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced in a video message the creation of a new branch which vowed to raise the flag of Jihad, return to Islamic rule, and empower the Sharia of Allah across the Indian Subcontinent. The head of AQIS, Asim Umar, subsequently spent years disseminating recruitment videos in J&K, but these did not yield tangible results. An intelligence report, meanwhile, disclosed in July 2014 that the prophecy of Ghazwa-e-Hind, or the ‘final battle in India’, was being used by Al Qaeda in its efforts to attract recruits in J&K and social media platforms were the preferred route to get the message across.
Whereas AQIS seeks to operate across the South Asian region, its leadership is based in Pakistan, and all of its major successful attacks till recently have been carried out either in Pakistan or Bangladesh. There is little information available vis-à-vis the exact relationship between AQIS and the Al-Qaeda core, although experts suggest that al-Zawahiri’s direct involvement at that time in choosing AQIS’ senior leadership implies of a relatively close connection between the two entities.
It appears that AQIS has been competing for influence and resources with IS and other terrorist organisations in their contesting attempts of retaining a stronghold over South Asia. It is interesting to note that with the growing dominance of IS and AQIS, the demography of terrorist recruits appears to have altered significantly.
Then in 2017, Al Qaeda announced the formation of a J&K-specific wing called the Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind (AGH), and although this outfit never grew anywhere close enough to threaten the establishment of a Caliphate in J&K, it did nonetheless achieve some traction and planted the seeds of a divisive and even more violence-driven ideology in Jammu & Kashmir, as the recent Red Fort attack exhibits today that the new dangerous ideology that the AGH sought to introduce into J&K has the potential to linger on in times to come and usher in a new discourse that earlier has been alien to the culture and polity of the region.
The jury is still out on the real impact that these groups have had on the existing terrorist structures in J&K. Three things are clear, though. Firstly, it will not replace the existing Pakistan-sponsored militancy in J&K and will not lead to the creation of a Caliphate. Secondly, without direct support from Pakistani intelligence agencies as well as safe havens within Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied J&K, any terrorist outfit in J&K will find it extremely difficult to survive.
Al Qaeda has been known to have linkages in the past with some of the Kashmir-centric groups based in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied J&K, case in point would be David Headly and the Mumbai attacks in 2008, and as early as 2014, Syed Salahuddin, Supreme of the terrorist organization Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) had announced that he was willing to take the help of Al Qaeda, the Taliban or any other organization or country. Thirdly, these groups, despite not having succeeded in recruiting a large number of members in J&K, do pose a significant threat to the Indian government as the Red Fort attack has manifested.
The successes of these groups, even if limited in scale, could possibly mean that these entities may well have reached some sort of hand-in-glove understanding for logistical support with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI has mastered the art of creating new terrorist outfits which step into the shoes of other ISI-created terrorist groups operating in J&K once international pressure kicks in forcefully against the existing group. Thus, over the decades the prominence of JKLF was passed on to HM as the primary terrorist outfit fighting on behalf of the ISI in J&K after which it was taken over by the LeT once the heat against HM became unpalatable. Similarly, in recent years, especially after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the LeT was replaced by the JeM.
The future of these groups in South Asia depends on an extensive number of factors, and all possible outcomes must be explored. As it is unlikely that any of these groups will be able to physically hold territory in any South Asian country, they will most likely rely on increasing online radicalisation and recruitment methods. Attention must also be paid to Madrassas, many of which are fronts of extremist groups and are notorious for preaching radical interpretations of Islam and sending students to battlefronts, and these groups could potentially find a new generation of recruits within these Madrassas that are run by people sympathetic to the cause of these terrorist groups.
The Red Fort attack and other major attacks in recent years in South Asia serve as proof that these groups are using all possible means to survive and thrive, leaving in their wake major headlines, high body counts and a palpable menace. These groups have latched on to friends and designated foes to become credible actors and to dig their claws in deeply in South Asia. Their future will heavily be determined by the ability of both State and non-State actors which want to see them defeated, to align their agendas and effectively cooperate.
Cutting recruitment, propaganda and financial lifelines seem a logical place to start. However, ensuring the efficiency of these approaches requires regional cooperation, at the very least, considering the cross-border nature of terrorism. Thus, like Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, South Asian countries should consider developing a model similar to the Trilateral Agreement, which is a prime example of international cooperation.
Due to undeniable historical animosity between governments and their diverging agendas, the process of creating cooperation mechanisms regarding terrorism and transnational crime would certainly be impacted by politics in South Asia. A country like Pakistan, with a proven history of employing terrorism and supporting terrorist groups as State policy, remains the biggest stumbling block in this regard.
The Indian security apparatus would do well to recognize that apart from the established terrorist organizations like LeT, HM and JeM, the mysterious advent of these international terrorist organizations and their infrastructure of Madrassas, online presence, propaganda techniques, funding networks and new-age recruitment policies need to be monitored closely to ensure that it is not able to capitalize in the years ahead upon the trend of growing radicalization amongst sections of the youth in J&K.
The role of the ISI in strengthening such groups as part of a new strategy to keep violence alive in J&K in order to protect the pre-eminence of the Pakistani military establishment, especially, needs to be watched with a hawk’s eye and countered promptly and robustly.
(The author is the Director of the European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS) and can be reached at: [email protected])
