On 22 July, the Quad foreign ministers (of the US, India, Japan, and Australia) held yet another meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Manila. This was preceded by three Quad ministerial meetings since the commencement of the Trump administration 2.0, held in January and July 2025 and in May 2026. The irony lies in the popular perception that, despite these frequent meetings, Quad is becoming more of a talk shop than a forum whose concrete partnership projects are carefully assessed, monitored and implemented. This emerges in the broader context that the concept of the Indo-Pacific has been losing some of its salience, given that the US, the most powerful member of the Quad, has adopted a softer policy approach towards China. Besides, it has been focusing its attention on other priority regions such as West Asia, Europe and the western hemisphere.
In this backdrop, a closer look at the latest Quad meeting may be worthwhile. The meeting lasted for an hour. It resulted in a very brief joint press release which reaffirmed the participants’ “commitment to strengthening a free and open Indo-Pacific and unwavering support for ASEAN unity and centrality.” Nothing original there. It went on to voice support for the practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) around the shared priorities of maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. There was no mention or even hint of whether specific projects identified by ASEAN nations have gone through various stages of implementation.
Further research disclosed more details about the Quad meeting in Manila. The Japanese foreign ministry was a little more generous than its counterparts in shedding light on the outcome of the dialogue. It made two significant points. One, the participants “aligned their perspectives” on the situations in the Indo-Pacific and West Asia regions. Two, they focused their attention on two specific flashpoints. Regarding the East China Sea and the South China Sea, Japan expressed “strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion.” (This is a clear reference to actions by China). Further, Tokyo emphasised Quad’s commitment to the complete denuclearisation of North Korea and the importance of addressing malicious cyber activities. Finally, the Japanese side also disclosed that the Quad foreign ministers were working to convene the next Quad Leaders’ Summit and the foreign ministers meeting, possibly later in 2026, for “maintaining close coordination within the Quad framework.”
This broad approach adopted by the Quad needs to be examined with reference to the latest position articulated by the ASEAN foreign ministers on some of these issues. A few observations may be relevant here.
First, the grouping called on its partners to “promote and mainstream the implementation of concrete AOIP projects and activities.” Second, it noted the concerns expressed by “some ministers” of member States on the land reclamations, activities and serious incidents in the South China Sea; called for the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC); and expressed the hope that negotiations for the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) would be concluded by end of 2026. Incidentally, ASEAN has been expressing such hope for many years.
Third, the 192-paragraph joint communiqué contains no reference to Quad. However, it does highlight the inclusive role of the East Asia Summit (EAS) – which has all the Quad nations as well as China, Russia and others as its members. It projects EAS as a “premier Leaders-led forum” for dialogue and cooperation on broad strategic, political, and economic issues of common interest and concern, showing that ASEAN remains committed to an inclusive approach to addressing the region’s challenges, as outlined in Para 171.
India remains amply invested in Quad, ensuring its full participation in all its key initiatives such as the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, Quad Ports of the Future Partnership, Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and Advancing Innovation for Empowering NextGen Agriculture.
Yet, it is not placing all its eggs in the Quad basket, having noted the US president’s coldness toward Quad. This seems to have led New Delhi to pay special attention to strengthening, deepening, and diversifying its bilateral relations with two of the Quad members – Japan and Australia – as well as other key states in the region, especially Indonesia and New Zealand. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to India (July 1–3) and PM Modi’s ambitious voyage to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand (July 6–11) served this strategic goal. The two visits have undoubtedly strengthened India’s interest and presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The degree of success in implementing a host of decisions and agreements will shape the future.
An important point about India’s view on the Indo-Pacific came through during Modi’s visit to Indonesia. Both nations were on the same page when it came to defining the characteristics of the region in the future. They stated that it must have seven key characteristics–“a free, open, transparent, rules-based, peaceful, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.” All these features are vital, especially the last–“inclusive.” Are the Asian maritime democracies prepared to go beyond the Quad framework and coexist peacefully with China as an indispensable competitor and partner in the Indo-Pacific? They probably will be ready to do so, provided China respects international law and plays by accepted rules and norms. As regards India, it will continue to pragmatically improve and manage its complex relations with China, while collaborating with all those powers that are anxious about China’s preference to dominate the Indo-Pacific and turn it into a realm of unipolarity.
Regardless of whether the US considers the Indo-Pacific strategically important, it is and will remain a high priority for India. What, therefore, will be prudent for New Delhi is to continue pursuing a well-crafted, multi-pronged approach to safeguard its national interest in the region at a time of growing tensions and turbulence.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Rajiv Bhatia, Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House and former ambassador.
