Pakistan appears to be entering one of the most politically consequential months in recent times. President Asif Ali Zardari’s extended stay abroad, growing speculation about his political relationship with the country’s powerful establishment, Nawaz Sharif’s apparent recalibration, the Pakistan Peoples Party’s resistance to any division of Sindh, and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s preparations for a major protest movement have together created an atmosphere of uncertainty.
September could prove to be a month that determines the direction of Pakistan’s politics in the months ahead. However, separating confirmed developments from political speculation remains essential.
The most intriguing political development concerns President Asif Ali Zardari.
Zardari left Pakistan with members of his family on August 27 for what was officially described as a private visit to Europe, and he is at present staying in London. On the surface, there was nothing unusual about the journey. Pakistani political leaders frequently travel abroad, particularly to London and Dubai, where many maintain personal, political and family connections.
But the timing of Zardari’s departure has generated intense speculation. Veteran political commentators publicly raised the possibility that Zardari’s extended stay abroad might represent something more than an ordinary private visit. He suggested that the President could be entering a period resembling a “semi-exile”.
There is no official indication that Zardari has left Pakistan under pressure or that he is unable to return. Nevertheless, in Pakistan’s political environment, symbolism often becomes as important as official statements.
Zardari’s departure came at a time when the PPP appeared increasingly confrontational over reports and political discussions concerning the possible restructuring or division of the existing four provinces into 33.
Almost immediately after his departure, political temperatures in Sindh rose. The Sindh Assembly had scheduled proceedings and resolutions in late August, while the PPP intensified its political messaging against any attempt to divide the province. Civil society groups, lawyers and political workers also became increasingly active.
PPP leaders, including Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah and other senior figures, adopted a firm position against any attempt to redraw Sindh’s political boundaries. The question being asked in political circles is simple: Was the timing merely coincidental, or was Zardari’s foreign visit part of a larger political calculation?
The present speculation inevitably brings back memories of 2015.
At that time, Zardari delivered his famous warning that the establishment should not forget its constitutional limits, using the phrase that he could make “brick answer brick” — a political threat that dramatically escalated tensions.
Soon afterwards, he spent a prolonged period outside Pakistan, largely in Dubai.
He returned after a long absence, and the episode became another example of the complicated and often unpredictable relationship between Pakistan’s civilian politicians and its military establishment.
This historical experience explains why Zardari’s current foreign stay is attracting so much attention. If the President remains abroad for an extended period, even without making public statements, his absence itself could become politically significant. A serving President remaining outside the country for a prolonged period amid political tensions would inevitably generate questions — both inside Pakistan and internationally.
But it would still be premature to describe the situation as exile. At present, the more accurate description is political uncertainty.
The PPP has taken one of its clearest political positions in recent months. It has strongly opposed the idea of dividing Sindh or creating new provinces that could alter the existing political geography of Pakistan. The party’s position is politically important because Sindh remains the PPP’s principal political stronghold. For the PPP, therefore, the issue is not merely constitutional.
It is also about political survival.
The PPP’s opposition to Sindh’s division is motivated primarily by political control and the protection of entrenched interests. That is an opinion and cannot be treated as an established fact. Supporters of the PPP, on the other hand, argue that the division of Sindh could weaken provincial autonomy and create fresh ethnic and political tensions. Whatever the motivation, one thing is increasingly clear: the PPP has chosen to take a public political stand.
And that stand could complicate any attempt to build a broad national consensus around the creation of new provinces.
Experts in Pakistan also said that President Zardari wants his son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari should be made the next Prime Minister, but Pakistani Army Chief General Asif Munir is more interested in Maryam Nawaz, present Chief Minister of Pakistani Punjab and former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif.
While the PPP has adopted an aggressive political position, Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz appear to be following a more cautious path.
For years, Nawaz Sharif’s political career has been shaped by a complicated relationship with Pakistan’s military establishment.
There have been periods of confrontation.
There have also been periods of cooperation.
The current political environment appears to have produced another phase of calculation.
There are speculations that Nawaz Sharif may be willing to support major constitutional or political arrangements in return for a larger political role for his daughter, Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz.
Pakistani experts said that Nawaz Sharif has given assurance to the Pak Army that PML( N) will support the army’s move to establish new provinces or states, but his daughter, Maryam Nawaz, should be made the next Prime Minister of Pakistan. There is no publicly established evidence of such a bargain. Yet the broader political question remains relevant. Where does Nawaz Sharif stand if Pakistan enters another major phase of constitutional restructuring?
Will the PML-N support the creation of new provinces?
Or will its position depend on broader political negotiations?
These questions remain unanswered.
The PML-N’s political strategy appears markedly different from that of the PPP.
The PPP is publicly drawing political lines. The PML-N appears to be keeping its options open.
Why London Matters
London has once again become an important political reference point.
Pakistani politics has repeatedly travelled to London. Political leaders have held meetings there, undergone medical treatment there, lived there during periods of exile and conducted informal political consultations there.
With several Pakistani political figures and influential personalities travelling to Britain, speculation has naturally increased.
However, the belief that “major decisions will be made in London” should also be treated cautiously.
Pakistan’s political history demonstrates that informal political conversations may occur abroad, but decisions ultimately depend upon the balance of power within Pakistan.
London may be a meeting place. It is not necessarily the place where Pakistan’s political future will be decided.
While the PPP and PML-N calculate their political positions, PTI is preparing for confrontation. The party has announced a major long march and protest movement scheduled for September 27.
PTI leaders have repeatedly linked the proposed movement to demands concerning the release and medical treatment of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Chief Minister Sohail Afridi has publicly said that the September 27 movement remains central to PTI’s political strategy. In recent statements, he described the planned campaign as a decisive struggle for Imran Khan’s release.
The PTI has also been attempting to broaden its political mobilisation beyond Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Sohail Afridi has taken PTI’s movement to Sindh
KP Chief Minister Sohail Afridi and PTI’s central leadership has undertaken a five-day political tour of Sindh.
The campaign is part of PTI’s wider “street movement”.
According to the announced programme, the leadership is scheduled to travel through several major towns and cities.
The itinerary includes areas around Jacobabad, Shikarpur, Larkana, Naushehro Feroze, Nawabshah, Sanghar, Mirpurkhas, Umerkot, Hyderabad and Karachi.
PTI leaders have described the tour as an attempt to mobilise party workers and build momentum before the September 27 protest. The visit is politically important for another reason.
Sindh is traditionally considered difficult political territory for PTI. A successful mobilisation campaign there would allow the party to argue that its movement has acquired a genuinely national character.
The announced schedule also includes meetings with lawyers and party workers in Karachi.
Whether the PTI succeeds in generating large crowds remains to be seen. But the party’s intention is clear: September 27 is not meant to emerge suddenly. It is being prepared through weeks of political mobilisation.
Another development adding to political uncertainty concerns Imran Khan himself.
A report attributed to an unnamed senior PTI leader claimed that attempts were being discussed to move Khan abroad, possibly to Britain, under conditions that could restrict his political activities.
The report suggested that his former wife Jemima Goldsmith, their sons and possibly the British government could be asked to provide guarantees.
According to the claim, Imran Khan would not be expected to make political statements if transferred abroad.
The same report claimed that Khan had shown no willingness to accept such an arrangement.
These claims require considerable caution.
They are based on a political source and have not been independently confirmed.
A report carrying similar claims said that the alleged proposal had not been accepted by Khan.
What is confirmed, however, is that Imran Khan’s health and treatment remain central issues in Pakistan’s political debate. PTI has repeatedly demanded improved medical care and his release.
Recent reporting has also focused on his transfer for medical examination and subsequent political controversy over the implementation of court orders.
The issue has become more than a legal matter. It is now central to PTI’s political mobilisation.
A crowded political battlefield
Pakistan’s political landscape is becoming increasingly crowded.
Maulana Fazlur Rehman has intensified his political criticism.
PTI is preparing for a nationwide movement. The PPP has taken a firm position on Sindh.
Lawyers and civil society groups are becoming politically active. Political tensions continue in Balochistan. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remains politically volatile.
Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir(PoJK) has also witnessed political instability and renewed tensions.
In this atmosphere, the relative political caution of the PML-N becomes even more noticeable.
Almost every major political force appears to be preparing for some form of political struggle.
The PML-N, however, seems more interested in managing the existing balance of power.
That may be a strategy. Or it may become a political weakness.
Pakistan’s politics has historically been shaped by three competing forces.
The elected political leadership. The military establishment.
And public political mobilisation.
At different times, one of these forces becomes dominant.
The current situation suggests that all three are once again moving. The establishment remains the most powerful institution in the country’s political structure.
The PML-N appears to be attempting to maintain a workable relationship with the existing power structure. The PPP has chosen confrontation on at least one major issue.
And PTI is attempting to bring political pressure onto the streets. This combination makes September unusually important.
The debate over new provinces may prove particularly difficult.
Creating new provinces requires constitutional procedures and, more importantly, broad political consensus.
A determined PPP opposition could significantly complicate any such effort. The PML-N alone may not be able to carry such a major constitutional project.
And the wider political environment is hardly favourable for consensus. Pakistan is already dealing with economic pressures, political polarisation, regional instability and growing public distrust.
A debate over provincial boundaries could add another layer of conflict.
The creation of provinces is therefore not merely an administrative question. In Pakistan, it involves identity, language, ethnicity, political power and access to resources.
Any attempt to redraw provincial boundaries could produce consequences far beyond parliament.
The next few weeks will provide important answers.
Will Zardari return quickly to Pakistan?
Will his foreign stay become prolonged?
Will the PPP intensify its confrontation over Sindh?
Will Nawaz Sharif publicly clarify the PML-N’s position?
Will PTI successfully mobilise large numbers of people?
Will Imran Khan’s health situation further intensify political tensions?
And most importantly, what will happen on September 27?
PTI leaders have repeatedly insisted that preparations for the planned long march will continue.
The party has described the movement as a struggle for legal, constitutional and political rights, while its leaders have also used increasingly strong political language.
That creates the possibility of a politically explosive month.
But Pakistan has seen similar moments before.
Large political announcements do not always produce large political transformations.
Sometimes negotiations occur behind closed doors.
Sometimes pressure is reduced before a confrontation.
And sometimes events take a completely unexpected direction.
Pakistan is entering September with too many political questions and too few clear answers. Asif Ali Zardari is abroad, and speculation surrounds the duration and political meaning of his stay.
The PPP has adopted an increasingly firm position against any division of Sindh.
Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N appear to be carefully navigating their relationship with Pakistan’s powerful establishment.
PTI is preparing a nationwide political mobilisation culminating in its proposed September 27 long march.
And Imran Khan remains at the centre of Pakistan’s political storm.
For now, it would be dangerous to treat speculation as fact.
Claims about secret political deals, Zardari’s alleged “semi-exile”, possible arrangments for Imran Khan’s transfer abroad, or negotiations over the future of Pakistan’s provinces remain largely unverified.
But political speculation itself can become powerful.
In Pakistan, rumours often influence political behaviour.
Foreign travel can become a political signal. And an announced protest can change calculations even before a single protester reaches the streets.
September 2026, therefore, may not necessarily produce an immediate political earthquake.
But it could determine the direction of Pakistan’s next political confrontation.
The coming weeks will show whether Pakistan moves towards negotiation, constitutional restructuring and political accommodation — or towards another cycle of confrontation between political parties, state institutions and the streets.
One thing, however, is increasingly clear.
Pakistan’s politics is accelerating.
And September may prove to be the month when the country’s competing political forces finally reveal their cards.
(The author is Former Bureau Chief, Aaj Tak TV, Jammu)
