The scale of that exposure is considerable. The US imported about $104bn of goods from India in 2025, while two-way US-India trade in goods and services was roughly $240bn, according to the US Trade Representative.
India’s exports to the US include electronics, pharmaceuticals, machinery, jewellery, chemicals, textiles and petroleum products. In 2025, electrical and electronic equipment alone accounted for about $25.8bn of Indian exports to America, pharmaceuticals about $9.7bn and machinery about $7.2bn.
The new threat comes after an earlier round of Trump tariffs on Indian goods, which peaked at 50% in 2025 before being reduced.
That creates an uncomfortable calculation for Delhi: how much should India pay for Russian crude before the savings are outweighed by the risk to its exports to the US?
There is no simple answer. It will depend on the Russian discount, global crude prices, freight and insurance costs, the tariff Trump ultimately imposes, and whether Washington offers exemptions or reaches a broader settlement with Delhi.
The picture gets more complicated once the crude is refined. India is not merely a buyer: its refineries turn Russian crude into fuels that can then be exported.
Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries have forced the world’s once-largest oil-products exporter to import fuel. In August, imports hit a record 172,000 tonnes, more than seven times the previous monthly high, according to CREA. India supplied about 120,000 tonnes, or roughly 70%, mostly petrol refined from Russian crude at a refinery in Gujarat, worth around €78m.
China buys more Russian crude than India, but Kugelman says Beijing has greater leverage because of its role in global supply chains and the scale of its economic relationship with the US.
“China has massive leverage over the global economy, particularly through its dominance of critical supply chains. India, despite being one of the world’s biggest economies, does not have the same leverage. The Trump administration appears to believe that its economic interests are more exposed if China retaliates than if India does,” says Kugelman.
For India, the issue is not simply how much Russian oil it buys, but how resilient its alternatives are.
The threat is serious because India imports more than 88% of its crude oil.
More than 85% of India’s crude comes from just six countries, several in conflict-prone regions, while its refineries are not always equipped to switch easily between crude grades, according to the think-tank Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW).
The vulnerability extends beyond oil. India imports more than 60% of its LPG, the main cooking fuel for more than 330 million households. Its strategic petroleum reserves hold only 9-10 days of net oil imports, compared with roughly 200 days in Japan and 207 in South Korea. Operational stocks at refineries provide another 64 days.
All this makes Russian crude more than a bargain: CEEW estimates that India has saved about $12.6bn from its post-2022 shift to Russian crude.
The looming US tariff could now turn that insurance into a liability – leaving Delhi to calculate whether the savings from Russian oil are worth the price of keeping it.
GTRI’s Srivastava reckons “Washington could threaten tariffs of up to 100%, then offer a lower rate if Delhi cuts Russian oil purchases and accepts concessions in a deeply unequal trade deal”.
“India should not allow US tariff threats to determine its energy policy,” he says. “It should continue buying Russian oil as long as it remains commercially competitive and negotiate firmly with Washington without granting unilateral trade concessions.”
